Archive for 13 November, 2009

cz32ts – an interesting banana!

Posted in General Security, Malware on 13 November, 2009 by Alec Waters

I think I’ve found the cz32ts executable – VirusTotal has this to say about it. What is more interesting is what Anubis has to say about it – check out the Network Activity section.

Basically, the executable goes off to a C&C server on 205.209.143.94 for a list of URLs to attack using the GETPHPURL command. It then tries to SQL inject the victim site, using the executable name as its user agent (all of the ones in my capture have i1 as the user agent, because that was the name of the executable I retrieved). Once the SQL injection tests have been carried out, it then reconnects to the C&C server to report the result of the attempt using the CMDPUTLINK command.

I have no idea how cz32ts.exe is distributed, but it would seem like the ideal thing for a dropper to pull down and set to run once on startup.

Anyone fancy shutting down 205.209.143.94?


Alec Waters is responsible for all things security at Dataline Software, and can be emailed at alec.waters(at)dataline.co.uk

cz32ts – evil twin of NV32ts?

Posted in General Security, Malware on 13 November, 2009 by Alec Waters

There is an update to this post here.

In the past, we’ve seen various automated SQL Injection attempts bearing a User-Agent of NV32ts. It’s all a little odd, since:

  • The attempts are dead easy to spot, thanks to the user agent (there’s even a Snort rule for detecting it)
  • The attempts could be described as recon-only, since they didn’t seek to change anything.

Two injection attempts would be made by the attacker. The injected SQL would look like this:

%20And%20char(124)%2b(Select%20Cast(Count(1)%20as
%20varchar(8000))%2Bchar(124)%20From%20[sysobjects]
%20Where%201=1)>0

And this:

‘%20And%20char(124)%2b(Select%20Cast(Count(1)%20as
%20varchar(8000))%2Bchar(124)%20From%20[sysobjects]
%20Where%201=1)>0%20and%20”=’

These two cover the cases for vulnerable non-string and string parameters, and each case would be attached to the end of  the URL under test, after the last parameter. We’d usually see a spate of attempts in a short space of time from different source IP addresses, possibly suggesting that some botnet or other is doing all the work (possibly even Conficker).

Yesterday, we saw another run of attempts with the same pattern. A handful of source IP addresses targetted the same victim websites, each trying the same URL twice, appending the same two SQL statements as above. The only difference is the user agent – what was NV32ts has become cz32ts.

It’s still something of a mystery, though. Why use such a distinctive user agent? Why change it? What are the baddies looking for? If they’re going to go to the bother of scanning for sites vulnerable to SQL injection, why don’t they just try to inject something? Why conduct all this recon, when it would be difficult to reliably detect if you’re actually talking to a vulnerable site? Are the botmasters selling lists of potentially vulnerable sites rather than exploiting them themselves?

Any ideas?


Alec Waters is responsible for all things security at Dataline Software, and can be emailed at alec.waters(at)dataline.co.uk