Archive for April, 2010

An ode to lockdowns

Posted in Silly on 20 April, 2010 by Alec Waters

A quick guest post from a Mr P. Floyd, unhappy with his organisation’s corporate security posture:

We don’t need no Anti-Virus
We don’t need no port control
No harsh restrictions on the desktop
Admins leave PCs alone!

We don’t need no complex passwords
We don’t need no AUP
No blocking YouTube on a Friday
Admins leave PCs alone!
Hey! Admins! Leave PCs alone!!


Alec Waters is responsible for all things security at Dataline Software, and can be emailed at alec.waters(at)dataline.co.uk

Rear echelon NSM

Posted in General Security, NSM on 20 April, 2010 by Alec Waters

When it comes to any kind of traffic analysis device, proper placement is of critical importance – if it’s in the wrong place on the network, it won’t be able to see what you hope it will, and you’ll be blind to any badness that it could potentially detect.

If you work for the kind of company that develops (and subsequently hosts or supports) interactive web applications for clients, having a sensor keep watch over a your Internet-facing production servers is probably a good idea. However, how did all of your clients’ web application goodness get onto a production server in the first place? With a bit of luck, each application started its life on some kind of private development server, after which it moved onto a public user acceptance testing (UAT) server for the client to take a look at. Only after client sign-off would it have moved to the production server.

I think that it’s a good idea to place sensors to watch over the seemingly less-important development and UAT servers, too. Let’s take each in turn:

Development Severs

Dev boxes are usually well within an organisation’s perimeter, behind firewalls and the like. Why would anyone try to take hostile action against a dev server? Surely if an attacker was even in a position to do so, you’d have far greater problems than attacks on the dev server – you’d have an attacker roaming at will within the castle walls. So what’s the point?

Well, here’s an example. Let’s say your sensor is loaded up with a whole bunch of signatures that attempt to detect various classes of web attack (SQL Injection, XSS, etc.), and you’ve got developers who just love technologies like AJAX and JSON. It’s terribly useful to have an AJAX request return some JSON-formatted data, a bit like the example here (seems to work OK in IE and FireFox). Type the letter A into the first textbox, and an AJAX request is made to the server which returns a JSON-formatted resultset of people whose names begin with A (fire up Wireshark and take a look at the requests for /specials/ajax_autosuggest/test.php). This resultset can then be parsed by the browser, and the data processed in whatever manner is necessary. Powerful stuff!

There’s nothing wrong with the example on the page above, but AJAX can go pear shaped if a developer is tempted to embed raw SQL sentences into the request (or even partial sentences like ‘where’ clauses). AJAX requests are under-the-bonnet affairs that don’t appear in the browser’s Location bar so it’s easy to think that they are out of sight and out of mind, when they can often be run directly and outside of their intended context. Any attacker worth their salt will discover and leverage a vulnerable AJAX page, and if there’s raw SQL in it it’s bad news for the application concerned – you’re offering them the chance to execute arbitrary SQL against your server.

So how can NSM help? With a bit of luck, our sensor has signatures like the ones below that stand a chance of picking up raw SQL elements in AJAX requests:

alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”SQL generic sql insert injection atttempt – GET parameter”; flow:established,to_server; uricontent:”insert”; nocase; pcre:”/insert\s+into\s+[^\/\\]+/Ui”; metadata:policy security-ips drop, service http; reference:url,www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/5DP0N1P76E.html; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:13513; rev:5;)

alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”SQL generic sql exec injection attempt – GET parameter”; flow:established,to_server; uricontent:”exec”; nocase; pcre:”/exec\s+master/Ui”; metadata:policy security-ips drop, service http; reference:url,www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/5DP0N1P76E.html; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:13512; rev:5;)

alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”SQL generic sql update injection attempt – GET parameter”; flow:established,to_server; uricontent:”update”; nocase; pcre:”/update\s+[^\/\\]+set\s+[^\/\\]+/Ui”; metadata:policy security-ips drop, service http; reference:url,www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/5DP0N1P76E.html; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:13514; rev:7;)

etc…

If signatures like these start firing whilst a new application is under development (and not under attack), it’s time to talk to the developers. Better to nip a vulnerability like this in the bud pre-deployment than to rush out an emergency hotfix post-breach. Even if the SQL isn’t exploitable (can you prove it?), you’re still giving too much away in the form of table and column names.

As an added bonus, an NSM sensor with full-packet capture capability can be used as a handy debugging aid when an obscure browser doesn’t work as expected – there ain’t no substitute for the actual HTTP transaction at times like these!

UAT Servers

These boxes are often sitting on the Internet proper so that the client can come along and review and test pre-release versions of the application. By definition, these are test servers, and may therefore have bugs and vulnerabilities that will hopefully be ironed out during the testing cycle; error reporting may also be turned up to the most verbose level to help the process. There may also be other code present for other projects, or experimental code left by someone wanting to test a theory, or all manner of other flotsam and jetsam.

All of this is advantageous to an attacker, and may eventually allow them access to the server. UAT boxes sometimes need to have “real” customer data on them for realistic testing, which makes them just as high-value a target as the production box. What if the UAT server is also a staging area for deployment? What if an attacker could add their own backdoor code into the staging area, ready for deployment later on?

Dismissing the need to monitor development and UAT servers because “they’re not live machines” sounds like a recipe for trouble to me. You need to protect your assets at all stages of their lifecycle, from the initial brainstorming to the great fdisk in the sky!


Alec Waters is responsible for all things security at Dataline Software, and can be emailed at alec.waters(at)dataline.co.uk

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